It has been three months since the now infamous Downing Street memos first began appearing in the British press. In fact, according to Slate, there are seven memos:
the famous minutes; a secret Cabinet Office report written two days before the ministers' meeting (published last weekend by the Sunday Times and the Washington Post); and five eyes-only memos, written around the same time, about various official British meetings with President Bush, then-National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, and then-Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz.
For many, these memos are the “smoking gun” necessary to prove that the Bush administration willingly deceived and manipulated the American public and the world along with UK accomplices in their case for war in Iraq. While the evidence is not overwhelming for legal sanction against any party, it does serve to show how calculating the two parties were in an attempt to justify a war in Iraq. Frankly, the deception reaches a level as to warrant further investigation and at the very least a further lack of trust in our current President. And the links to a neoconservative agenda hidden in the shadows is equally unsettling.
The Memos
But judgments aside, it is important to view some of the information in its primary form to give some context (further information can be viewed any time at http://www.downingstreetmemo.com)
As originally reported in the The Sunday Times, May 1, 2005
SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY
DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02
cc: Defense Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell
IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY
John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.
Interpretation: Scarlett’s analysis basically showed that although Saddam expected an invasion, and although he did not believe the assault would be either immediate or overwhelming, it was clear that Iraq’s neighbors would ally against him, his army’s morale was poor and his “real” public support was at best narrow, or fear-based. If this is true, it would not appear that Saddam was in any way a “real” threat to anyone. Further, as we see today, that opposition to the US is no longer narrow but powerful and continuing.
C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.
Interpretation: “But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.” It is asserted by our own allies’ observations about US policy that Bush viewed Iraq as a “must invade” situation. Since he was frustrated with the UN route, he wished military action justified through a threat of terrorism and WMD. But evidently, the facts were distorted to support this justification.
The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections. … It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. ...
Interpretation: It appears Bush had already made his decision to go to war, basically at some point in the following months. Strangely, his timeline was scheduled 30 days before Congressional elections. Furthermore, the British make clear that the case was “thin” for war since Iraq was not threatening to its neighbor nations nor did it have serious WMD capability.
The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. … The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. … If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.
Interpretation: It was evident that simply wanted Saddam out of Iraq was not a sanctioned justification for invasion. The only “legal” possibilities were self-defense, humanitarian intervention, or UN authorization. It is not mentioned why the first two were explicitly ruled out (although, strangely, both of these ended up being real justifications despite UK rejection months before) though the former was unfounded and the latter would be hypocritical since sanctions were killing as many Iraqi’s and it was an inconsistent application of such relief since we ignored Turkey’s killing of the same Kurds Iraq was guilty of gassing.
Furthermore, it is clear that these two nations were already forming ways to “sell” the idea of war to the people. Strangely, to have to formulate such an option seems redundant if there was actually existed a justifiable case in the first place.)
… But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN. John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real. The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.
Interpretation: The ultimatum issue is one with which most of us are familiar. This basically rests on the notions of weapons inspectors and WMD scenarios. It is clear that the Americans were uninterested in using an ultimatum since force appeared to them to be the only option, for whatever reason.
It would appear, that unless the UK government is lying (which its recent acknowledgement of the validity of these memos would force) the American government has been. Lets take a look at a few inconsistencies with what was secretly reported by the Blair administration (in this memo ALONE) and what the Bush administration told the American people months later:
“I've not made up our mind about military action. [sic] Hopefully, this can be done peacefully...”Bush continued, George W. Bush, Mar. 6, 2003 White House Press Conference. Further, “We are doing everything we can to avoid war in Iraq.But if Saddam Hussein does not disarm peacefully, he will be disarmed by force,” George W. Bush said in aMar. 8, 2003 Radio Address.
This appears to directly contradict UK observations that military action was inevitable.
“I don't like war. [...] That's why I first went to the United Nations to begin with, on September the 12th, 2002, to address this issue as forthrightly as I knew how. That's why, months later, we went to the Security Council to get another resolution, called 1441...” Bush remarked in the sameMar. 6, 2003, White House Press Conference. And then argued that, “"America tried to work with the United Nations to address this threat because we wanted to resolve the issue peacefully. We believe in the mission of the United Nations." (Mar. 17, 2003,)The war began only two days after.
This completely contradicts the conclusion of the memo that “The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record” and that, “He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route."
Some Media Interpretations and Criticisms
There are other damaging points of reference in the memos that seek to paint the Bush administration in an impatient and militaristic light. Nevertheless, there are good criticisms of “smoking gun” interpretations of this and the remaining memos.
According to the Christian Science Monitor (June 21, 2005,):
Others have a different reading of this passage. The memo does not say specifically that Mr. Bush, or indeed any US official, saw war as inevitable. And at the time, the media was rife with commentary that war was most likely coming. If seen in that general sense, the conclusion was unsurprising. Nor did the document offer details of what intelligence was being fixed around what policy. Over the last year, a series of US studies have offered scathing conclusions about the poor nature of prewar US intelligence, and its uses.
Furthermore,
Neither Washington nor London has challenged the authenticity of any of the Downing memos. But both Bush and Blair have said that they do not reflect the full facts of war planning. As they reflect a uniquely British view of Washington actions, the papers provideinteresting insight into the general relationship of two old allies.
And Fred Kaplan of Slate (slat.msn.com) updated Wednesday, June 15, 2005:
"C" is the code name for Richard Dearlove, head of MI6, the British foreign intelligence service. His "recent talks in Washington" would almost certainly have been with his counterpart, George Tenet, then-director of the CIA. Tenet would have told him about the "perceptible shift in attitude." What accounts for it? "Bush wants to remove Saddam through military action." This is about as solid as the evidence gets on these matters: By mid-summer 2002—at a time when Bush was still assuring the American public that he regarded war as a "last resort"—the president had in fact put it on his front burners.
And further,
When the scholars write the big tomes on this sordid saga, they'll want to base their findings on primary-source documents—and here is one, flashing right before us. The Downing Street Memo will be a key footnote in the history books; it should have made front-page headlines in the daily broadsheets of history's first draft.
Nevertheless, Kaplan points out an interesting argument: that although the memos might point out that Bush was deceptive, it does not show that he and his administration actually believed that what they were saying was actually false, namely that WMD did not exist:
Read in conjunction with the six other British documents, the case weakens further. The memos do not show, for instance, that Bush simply invented the notion that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction or that Saddam posed a threat to the region. In fact, the memos reveal quite clearly that the top leaders in the U.S. and British governments genuinely believed their claims.
And,
What of the second half of the key quote from the Downing Street Memo of July 23—that Bush wanted war, justified by WMD and terrorism, but "the intelligence and the facts were being fixed around the policy"? It's worth noting that "fixed around" is not synonymous with "fixed." To say that Bush and his aides "fixed" intelligence—as some Web sites claim the memo shows—would mean that they distorted or falsified it. To say "the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy" means that they were viewing, sifting, and interpreting intelligence in a way that would strengthen the case for their policy, for going to war. Either way—"fixed" or "fixed around"—Bush and his aides had decided to let policy shape intelligence, not the other way around; they were explicitly politicizing intelligence.
They just knew Saddam had WMD, and if the facts didn't quite prove he did, they would underscore and embellish the tidbits that came close. The problem was, their man wasn't guilty, at least on the charges of indictment. Does this distinction matter? If all you want to know is whether Bush was deceptive, no; he was deceptive. If you want to know how government works, how officials make bad mistakes, yes; it matters a lot.
What does all of this mean? Well, for most of us it will probably mean that our government lied on some things or at the very least distorted facts to create a false sense of urgency around the need to go to war. And for most of us, that is simply a nuisance. Not for our troops, of course, who are dying in the hundreds each month or return to America disfigured and permanently handicapped. Not for their families who live in constant terror for their loved ones. Not for our American system of Justice which assumes that our leaders ought to have a greater sense of restraint and foresight not to “jump – the –gun” on matters which sop deeply affect our lives.
But there is one point often overlooked. That is the mysterious links between the neoconservative agenda and the events described above. According to Oldamericancentury.org, there is an organization known as the New American Century which is a “neoconservative think tank” whose goal is “to capitalize upon our surplus of military forces and funds and forcing American hegemony throughout the world.” Some members include, Karl Rove, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Jeb Bush, and Ron Wolfowitz to name only a few. The actual goals outlined by New American Century are as follows:
• we need to increase defense spending significantly if we are to carry out our global
responsibilities today and modernize our armed forces for the future;
• we need to strengthen our ties to democratic allies and to challenge regimes hostile to our interests and values;
• we need to promote the cause of political and economic freedom abroad;
• we need to accept responsibility for America's unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles.
This is in turn interpreted by those at Old American Century as follows:
- Increase an already enormous military budget at the expense of domestic social programs
- Toppling of regimes resistant to our corporate interests
- Forcing democracy at the barrel of a gun in regions that have no history of the democratic process
- Replacing the UNs role of preserving and extending international order
Who is correct? Well, if nothing else, Old American Century does point out some alarming connections between the NAC agenda and actual events as partially highlighted above.
OAC argues that the NAC organization’s method of global hegemony could not be realized “absent some catastrophic catalyzing event – like a new Pearl Harbor”(page 52.)
With this in mind, it may be more apparent why the Bush administration acted so aloof in reference to terrorism deterrence from the very beginning:
- Richard Clarke, who had a prominent Cabinet position with regards to terrorism under Clinton, was, according to Dick Cheney himself kept, “out of the loop.”
- Paul O’Neil, the former Secretary of Treasury, asserted publicly that the Bush administration did not take Al-Qaeda seriously as an “imminent threat.”
- Until it became public, the Bush administration completely ignored the presidential briefing, “Bin Laden determined to attack inside the United States.”
These among countless other oversights that not only occurred then but continue even now (just look at our border security and control and see how safe we really are!)
And as OAC reports, unlike our troops and the American public, the vistors in this campaign from day one of the war are much higher in position:
- Haliburton: once headed by Cheney
- Bechtel: once headed by Rumsfeld
- Trireme: defense company started by Deputy Secretary of Defense Richard Perle “shortly before the invasion!”
- Texas: that’s where the first oil tanker to leave Iraq went.
So there are no definite answers. All we have our pieces to a puzzle which moment by moment become more frighteningly clear. The evidence keeps mounting and the image becomes more frightening. After all, it is part of our history to have corruption in our ranks, perhaps even deeper than we ever thought possible.
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